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  1. #1 Russia's Black Sea Fleet Would Destroy NATO's Naval Squad . 
    An Adversary of Linda #'s
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    'NATO ships' funeral, a missile salvo away'

    NATO's naval squad is no match for Russia's Black Sea Fleet and would fall to pieces should the fleet launch a 'single missile salvo.'

    Former Russian commander Admiral Eduard Baltin said "a single missile salvo from the Moskva missile cruiser and two or three missile boats would be enough to annihilate the entire group."

    The one-time fleet commander was quoted by Ria Novosti as saying that the NATO squad looked better than they fought. "Despite the apparent strength" the 10-pieace NATO armada in the Black Sea "is not battle-worthy."

    He noted that the entire squadron could only brave the Black Sea Fleet for '20 minutes' adding that the NATO sailors would be "people with suicidal tendencies," if they lead a charge towards the Russian warships.

    While the conflict-ridden Georgia lies within the 900-kilometer (560-mile) reach of the NATO drill's whereabouts, the alliance keeps billing the measure as only a routine exercise.

    The time, however, seems inappropriate for such a potentially problematic move as, off the Georgian coast, the Russian warships have been tasked with keeping an eye on the powder keg of a situation in Georgia's violence-stricken province of South Ossetia.


    http://www.presstv.ir/detail.aspx?id...onid=351020602
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  2. #2  
    Senior Member Zathras's Avatar
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    Wonder how the Black Sea Fleet would deal with CVN airstrikes plus Harpoons and Tomahawks from the escorting cruisers, destroyers and attack subs if they pulled such a stunt.
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  3. #3  
    An Adversary of Linda #'s
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    Quote Originally Posted by Zathras View Post
    Wonder how the Black Sea Fleet would deal with CVN airstrikes plus Harpoons and Tomahawks from the escorting cruisers, destroyers and attack subs if they pulled such a stunt.

    Just one of these would do the job nicely .

    Of the 18 Ohio-class nuclear ballistic missile submarines built from 1976-1997, all are still in service.

    Four of them have been removed from strategic service and have been converted to SSGN cruise missile subs. USS Ohio (SSGN 726) and USS Florida (SSGN 728) rejoined the fleet last year, USS Michigan (SSGN 727) just rejoined the fleet a couple of weeks ago, and USS Georgia (SSGN 729) should rejoin this fall. snip
    ....
    Four ultra-stealthy Ohio-class SSBNs are having their 24 Trident II D-5 nuclear ballistic missiles removed and replaced with up to 154 Tomahawk cruise missiles. The USA is also adding accommodation for 66-102 special forces troops, special attachments for new Advanced SEAL Delivery System (ASDS) or older Seal Delivery Vehicle (SDV) “mini-subs,” and a mission control center. In future, the SSGNs may also carry UUV underwater robotic vehicles and even UAVs for aerial operations. Or just loaded with Tomahawk Missiles and sub launched mines.

    These things are very bad news for the Russian or Chinese Navy !


    http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/...-strike-01764/
    Last edited by megimoo; 08-30-2008 at 01:35 AM.
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  4. #4  
    An Adversary of Linda #'s
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    History of SSGN Capabilities

    During the Cold War we created the first SSBN by enlarging the partially-constructed hull of the then-named Scorpion. In only two years the conversion was complete, the ship was renamed USS George Washington (SSBN-598), and the concept of strategic deterrence was changed forever. Clearly, there is a well-established precedent of converting existing platforms into new ones built on proven concepts and the latest technology.

    Today’s “transformation” efforts include advanced sensors and surveillance systems, rapid precision strike, assured access to hostile or denied areas, and a high “tooth-to-tail ratio” (the ratio of combat power to required support). Responsive, forward-deployed units, survivable against anti-access threats, and capable of sustained high-volume strike with minimal logistic support, score high in these categories – SSGN is a prime example.

    "Even beyond its baseline mission capabilities, SSGN offers significant opportunities to develop and test new weapon delivery systems, sensors,
    and operational concepts that could further transform naval warfare."

    Overview of SSGN Capabilities

    Now that the program has been established, it’s a good time to regroup and summarize the status of SSGN. Here is a quick summary of the capabilities the baseline SSGN brings to joint warfare:

    TRIDENT stealth and reliability, with more than 20 years of service life remaining for
    each SSGN

    Large-volume precision strike, with up to 154 Tomahawk and Tactical Tomahawk
    cruise missiles

    Sustained Special Forces operations, to include insertion, extraction, and support of 66 Special Forces personnel, conditioned and ready, with onboard periods much longer than on SSNs

    Command center for mission planning and execution

    Capacity for conducting other SSN missions, such as intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and targeting (ISRT); anti-submarine warfare; anti-surface warfare;
    and mine warfare

    High-data-rate connectivity and joint command/control capability with a “Virginia-class” advanced SSN radio room and ISR suite

    70 percent operational availability by using two crews – to achieve a continuous, 2.65-ship deployed presence in support of CINC mission requirements

    20 times the payload of an SSN, with large ocean interfaces (22 seven-foot diameter launching tubes, two for SOF lock-out); opportunity for payload experimentation and development

    Payload

    Stealth, endurance, and agility have long enabled nuclear-powered submarines to take sensors and precision weapons into the fray with little or no logistical support. How- ever, in spite of their unmatched supremacy beneath the world’s oceans and their ability to strike with impunity with dozens of cruise missiles, the greatest limitation of today’s attack submarines is payload. As new off-board vehicles such as the Long-term Mine Reconnaissance System (LMRS) are introduced to the fleet, the cost of transporting and deploying these systems will be counted in terms of weapons left behind on the pier.

    Even beyond its baseline mission capabilities, SSGN offers significant opportunities to develop and test new weapon delivery systems, sensors, and operational concepts that could further transform naval warfare. Two examples already envisioned are encapsulated launch of a variety of tactical munitions and deployment of large unmanned undersea vehicles (UUVs) and off-board sensors. Encapsulated launch will send weapons to the surface for dry-launching, using a standardized buoyant capsule and a common interface for loading and communications. This modular approach to payloads will even allow use of “off-the-shelf” weapons, unmanned aerial vehicles, and decoys in support of joint forces. And, by developing large UUVs that make full use of the seven-foot tubes, they can surpass the range, endurance, and payload of small surveillance platforms and take on new missions – even offensive ones.

    Strike Capabilities

    The SSGN will bring a new dimension to strike warfare. Currently, SSNs with up to two-dozen Tomahawks usually launch missiles in salvos of three or four (16 maximum), while on SSGN a salvo of 20 missiles will represent less than 15 percent of the full load of 140 or 154 missiles. One might ask where the nearly 600 Tomahawks needed to fully arm four SSGNs will come from. The answer is – the Submarine Force. Existing submarine torpedo-tube launched (TTL) TLAMs will be converted for vertical launch to provide the required load-outs. Obviously, the number of TLAMs available to deploying SSNs will decrease as a result, but if you consider that a missile on an SSGN is deployed 70 percent of the time, the overall TLAM inventory immediately available to the CINCs will increase by about 50 to 60 percent. This shift of weapons will also open up some room in SSN torpedo rooms for more torpedoes or alternative payloads, like LMRS and other unmanned vehicles.

    http://www.navy.mil/navydata/cno/n87...ue_13/ssgn.htm
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