Page 2 of 3 FirstFirst 123 LastLast
Results 11 to 20 of 23
  1. #11  
    Power CUer noonwitch's Avatar
    Join Date
    Oct 2008
    Location
    Warren, MI
    Posts
    12,433
    Okay, Ody, now I need to read a bio of Sherman-not that I ever sympathized with the Confederate States of American Traitors. He has been demonized over the years-mostly by David Selznick's amazing (for 1939) portrayal of the burning of Atlanta in GWTW.


    Lots of stuff in Michigan is named after Sherman.
    Reply With Quote  
     

  2. #12  
    LTC Member Odysseus's Avatar
    Join Date
    May 2008
    Location
    FT Belvoir, VA
    Posts
    15,638
    Quote Originally Posted by wasp69 View Post
    Respectfully, sir, I must disagree on the grounds of a lack of evidence of Mr. Forrest ever leading a multi state march to inflict as much pain and destruction as humanly possible on non-combatants and destroy their means to survive. I fear that Mr. Hanson has taken a man who was a heaving, seething cauldron of issues and elevated him to a level he does not deserve.

    Mr. Sherman's blood lust against civilian populations has rightfully earned him a place in the deepest bowels of Hell, alongside other architects of the "total war" doctrine, postwar canonization notwithstanding.
    We will agree to disagree about General Sherman, but I do recommend Dr. Hanson's book, Ripples of Battle, which will give you new insights into Sherman.

    http://www.amazon.com/gp/reader/0385...pt#reader-link

    Forrest, the founder of the KKK, will, I suspect, be another area where we will have to agree to disagree.

    Quote Originally Posted by noonwitch View Post
    Okay, Ody, now I need to read a bio of Sherman-not that I ever sympathized with the Confederate States of American Traitors. He has been demonized over the years-mostly by David Selznick's amazing (for 1939) portrayal of the burning of Atlanta in GWTW.

    Lots of stuff in Michigan is named after Sherman.
    Hanson's take on Sherman is that at Shiloh, he was repelled by the losses inflicted on what he saw as innocent conscripts and vowed to take the fight to the southern aristocracy that had started the war. Consequently, he fought a new kind of war, which targeted infrastructure, but was remarkably bloodless, despite the rhetoric to the contrary. He inflicted tremendous material damage, but used maneuver to avoid casualties. Grant sustained a far bloodier campaign against Lee, by constantly engaging him in battle, but Sherman, who humiliated the south, is far more hated.
    --Odysseus
    Sic Hacer Pace, Para Bellum.

    Before you can do things for people, you must be the kind of man who can get things done. But to get things done, you must love the doing, not the people!
    Reply With Quote  
     

  3. #13  
    Senior Member DumbAss Tanker's Avatar
    Join Date
    Jun 2002
    Location
    Missouri
    Posts
    2,582
    A civilian (Not ROTC) professor of mine, in a military history class, once said only three senior generals he could think of in the Civil War actually understood strategic warfare in a real sense, although each side had quite a few excellent (And as many horrible) tacticians. He felt these were Grant, Lee, and Sherman, each with their own demons and issues. After many years of reading, battlefield visits, and staff rides, I think he was right, though at the time and in the arrogance of youth I didn't buy it.

    In the case of Sherman and Grant, these idiosyncracies tended to be more expressed in their personalities and personal problems than on the field, but despite his highly-burnished reputation and generally sterling character as a man, in Lee there was a negative military expression of these. Once committed to attack, he proved as unwilling to end it and cut his losses as a French general of 1916, a sound approach before the days of the rifled musket and certainly if your army is a match in numbers for your enemy's and you can muster local superiority, but these two conditions were rarely met in any of the Army of Northern Virginia's major engagements after the opening acts of the War.

    More often the results were more like 1916 France, due in large part to his conception of the shortcomings of his own soldiers, whom (In a way eerily reminiscent of the British view of French infantry in the Napoleonic Wars) he felt could only maintain their full fighting spirit on the offensive. Paradoxically the Southern soldiers proved quite resilient and resolute in defense when they were tested. Their failures in defense generally were far more attributable to weight of numbers, want of resources, or bad leadership decisions in the conduct of battle rather than any shortcoming of the soldiers' fighting spirit.

    Lee also seemed to have had a rather poor understanding of the civilian disposition to the war outside the Confederacy, leading to the debacles at Antietam and a year later at Gettysburg, in both of which the Army of Northern Virgina was very fortunate to escape at all, in the first due to McClellan's extreme overcaution and in the second due to an accident of weather. In both cases, Lee's strategic purpose in undertaking the operation was the intention to have a particular effect on the civil population in the objective state or region, and thus to have a strategic effect on the direction of the War. In both cases that strategic benefit failed spectacularly to materialize as he envisioned it, instead strengthening the Union and its resolve to win at any cost.

    Sherman's March was not without precedent as a method of strategic war, though conducted much more humanely than its antecedent, the chevausee of the Hundred Years War, which was a strategic form of warfare in that time...essentially it was a very large cavalry raid to cut a 20-mile-wide swath of fire and destruction through the enemy's territory, destroying all resources in its path to include the peasantry, generally re-entering friendly territory at a different point than the original line of departure.
    Reply With Quote  
     

  4. #14  
    Ancient Fire Breather Retread's Avatar
    Join Date
    Dec 2011
    Location
    I came to Texas as soon as I could
    Posts
    4,674
    Quote Originally Posted by wasp69 View Post
    Respectfully, sir, I must disagree on the grounds of a lack of evidence of Mr. Forrest ever leading a multi state march to inflict as much pain and destruction as humanly possible on non-combatants and destroy their means to survive. I fear that Mr. Hanson has taken a man who was a heaving, seething cauldron of issues and elevated him to a level he does not deserve.

    Mr. Sherman's blood lust against civilian populations has rightfully earned him a place in the deepest bowels of Hell, alongside other architects of the "total war" doctrine, postwar canonization notwithstanding.
    ^What he said.
    It's not how old you are, it's how you got here.
    It's been a long road and not all of it was paved.
    Live every day as if it were your last, because one of these days, it will be.
    Reply With Quote  
     

  5. #15  
    LTC Member Odysseus's Avatar
    Join Date
    May 2008
    Location
    FT Belvoir, VA
    Posts
    15,638
    Quote Originally Posted by DumbAss Tanker View Post
    A civilian (Not ROTC) professor of mine, in a military history class, once said only three senior generals he could think of in the Civil War actually understood strategic warfare in a real sense, although each side had quite a few excellent (And as many horrible) tacticians. He felt these were Grant, Lee, and Sherman, each with their own demons and issues. After many years of reading, battlefield visits, and staff rides, I think he was right, though at the time and in the arrogance of youth I didn't buy it.

    In the case of Sherman and Grant, these idiosyncracies tended to be more expressed in their personalities and personal problems than on the field, but despite his highly-burnished reputation and generally sterling character as a man, in Lee there was a negative military expression of these. Once committed to attack, he proved as unwilling to end it and cut his losses as a French general of 1916, a sound approach before the days of the rifled musket and certainly if your army is a match in numbers for your enemy's and you can muster local superiority, but these two conditions were rarely met in any of the Army of Northern Virginia's major engagements after the opening acts of the War.

    More often the results were more like 1916 France, due in large part to his conception of the shortcomings of his own soldiers, whom (In a way eerily reminiscent of the British view of French infantry in the Napoleonic Wars) he felt could only maintain their full fighting spirit on the offensive. Paradoxically the Southern soldiers proved quite resilient and resolute in defense when they were tested. Their failures in defense generally were far more attributable to weight of numbers, want of resources, or bad leadership decisions in the conduct of battle rather than any shortcoming of the soldiers' fighting spirit.

    Lee also seemed to have had a rather poor understanding of the civilian disposition to the war outside the Confederacy, leading to the debacles at Antietam and a year later at Gettysburg, in both of which the Army of Northern Virgina was very fortunate to escape at all, in the first due to McClellan's extreme overcaution and in the second due to an accident of weather. In both cases, Lee's strategic purpose in undertaking the operation was the intention to have a particular effect on the civil population in the objective state or region, and thus to have a strategic effect on the direction of the War. In both cases that strategic benefit failed spectacularly to materialize as he envisioned it, instead strengthening the Union and its resolve to win at any cost.

    Sherman's March was not without precedent as a method of strategic war, though conducted much more humanely than its antecedent, the chevausee of the Hundred Years War, which was a strategic form of warfare in that time...essentially it was a very large cavalry raid to cut a 20-mile-wide swath of fire and destruction through the enemy's territory, destroying all resources in its path to include the peasantry, generally re-entering friendly territory at a different point than the original line of departure.
    Lee's biggest failing wasn't strategic so much as tactical. His insistence on frontal assaults against fortified positions at Gettysburg, especially after his use of entrenching and field fortifications at his defense of Richmond, demonstrates that he didn't understand the tactical implications of rifling. Hood's request to bypass Little Round Top and strike the Union forces behind their lines was a better call, and probably would have been a decisive blow to the Union army, but Longstreet's refusal eliminated that COA.
    --Odysseus
    Sic Hacer Pace, Para Bellum.

    Before you can do things for people, you must be the kind of man who can get things done. But to get things done, you must love the doing, not the people!
    Reply With Quote  
     

  6. #16  
    Senior Member DumbAss Tanker's Avatar
    Join Date
    Jun 2002
    Location
    Missouri
    Posts
    2,582
    Quote Originally Posted by Odysseus View Post
    Lee's biggest failing wasn't strategic so much as tactical. His insistence on frontal assaults against fortified positions at Gettysburg, especially after his use of entrenching and field fortifications at his defense of Richmond, demonstrates that he didn't understand the tactical implications of rifling. Hood's request to bypass Little Round Top and strike the Union forces behind their lines was a better call, and probably would have been a decisive blow to the Union army, but Longstreet's refusal eliminated that COA.
    I did not mean that Lee's inability to break off a bad idea was a failure of his strategic thinking, just that while he was a strategic thinker, he was not a faultless battlefield commander.

    Due to the extremely colorful nature and a lot of great writing about it, the stand of the 20th Maine and its sister regiments on and around Little Round Top has become a fascination in the US Army, but personally after walking it several times and looking at the overall battle and force ratios, I don't think being flanked or forced off Little Round Top would've changed the outcome, in fact it probably would have destroyed Lee's army because they would have been completely committed to a fight against superior numbers, against a general who was not going to quit, and running out of ammo when the rivers across their retreat route flooded.

    Culp's Hill, and Ewell's failure to take that keystone point, was the actual turning point of the battle. That evening, everything the South was ever going to have was on the field, both in manpower and materiel, but the Army of the Potomac became stronger every hour as fresh units and supplies arrived from the railhead. By the time the battle for Little Round Top was underway, the South was in a time-distance-resource loop it could never win except by panicking the Northern general, and Meade was not that guy.

    Longstreet had no idea what was on the other side of the ridge and was executing Lee's ill-considered order in not flanking the hill, but Southern forces coming around that feature would have had a choice of going into the plain below, or trying to roll up the ridgeline defenses. Going into the plain below, it would have run into cleared land and half a mile away, the Union reserve assembly and staging area for arriving units and an artillery park that would have had no worries at all about counterbattery fire and lots of infantry with the time to constitute a defense while the Southern flanking forces checked to reconstitute and reorganize to exploit, not something they would be able to do instantly on rounding the hill, and with the disadvantage of exterior lines to their command at that. Any movement off the hill into the plain would also bring them under the guns of all the artillery deployed onto the southern half of the ridgeline running from the Round Tops northward, it not being all that hard to turn the many, many 12-pounders and 3-inch rifles up there who would be in range by 120 degrees or so. The other alternative, turning north to roll up the line, is the fantasy of alternate history buffs, but the corps to Longstreet's left was not prepared to make the fixing attack which would have been necessary to make that work, and an attempt to roll up the ridge would have been taken in its own flank by the large Federal forces in the assembly area in turn. Even driving the Army of the Potomac off the ridge without shattering it would not have won the battle, the Army of Northern Virginia would still have been committed, outnumbered 2-1, without resupply against an enemy with a secure railhead, and cut off from retreat by rising water, possibly ending the war in 1864 but not in the way Lee envisioned.

    With McClellan in charge of the Army of the Potomac, turning the flank at Little Round Top might have won the battle tactically for the South, due to his weaknesses but not any inherent in the forces of that Army. That ship had sailed long before the first shot was fired.
    Reply With Quote  
     

  7. #17  
    Senior Member wasp69's Avatar
    Join Date
    May 2012
    Posts
    421
    Quote Originally Posted by Odysseus View Post
    We will agree to disagree about General Sherman, but I do recommend Dr. Hanson's book, Ripples of Battle, which will give you new insights into Sherman.

    http://www.amazon.com/gp/reader/0385...pt#reader-link
    I guess we will. However, in regards to Mr. Sherman, I will stick with his actual words and historical documentation as opposed to V D Hanson's analysis. I have read enough revisionist history in regards to the War for Southern Independence and do not wish to read any more from a man who has come to the conclusions Hanson has. Thank you, but no thank you.

    Forrest, the founder of the KKK, will, I suspect, be another area where we will have to agree to disagree.
    Indeed we most probably will. We should also go ahead and agree to disagree about Sherridan (who did more to make misery for the Indians than whiskey, smallpox, and "Ol' Hickory" from lessons learned in the Shenandoah) and US Grant (anti Semite).
    Reply With Quote  
     

  8. #18  
    LTC Member Odysseus's Avatar
    Join Date
    May 2008
    Location
    FT Belvoir, VA
    Posts
    15,638
    Quote Originally Posted by DumbAss Tanker View Post
    I did not mean that Lee's inability to break off a bad idea was a failure of his strategic thinking, just that while he was a strategic thinker, he was not a faultless battlefield commander.

    Due to the extremely colorful nature and a lot of great writing about it, the stand of the 20th Maine and its sister regiments on and around Little Round Top has become a fascination in the US Army, but personally after walking it several times and looking at the overall battle and force ratios, I don't think being flanked or forced off Little Round Top would've changed the outcome, in fact it probably would have destroyed Lee's army because they would have been completely committed to a fight against superior numbers, against a general who was not going to quit, and running out of ammo when the rivers across their retreat route flooded.

    Culp's Hill, and Ewell's failure to take that keystone point, was the actual turning point of the battle. That evening, everything the South was ever going to have was on the field, both in manpower and materiel, but the Army of the Potomac became stronger every hour as fresh units and supplies arrived from the railhead. By the time the battle for Little Round Top was underway, the South was in a time-distance-resource loop it could never win except by panicking the Northern general, and Meade was not that guy.

    Longstreet had no idea what was on the other side of the ridge and was executing Lee's ill-considered order in not flanking the hill, but Southern forces coming around that feature would have had a choice of going into the plain below, or trying to roll up the ridgeline defenses. Going into the plain below, it would have run into cleared land and half a mile away, the Union reserve assembly and staging area for arriving units and an artillery park that would have had no worries at all about counterbattery fire and lots of infantry with the time to constitute a defense while the Southern flanking forces checked to reconstitute and reorganize to exploit, not something they would be able to do instantly on rounding the hill, and with the disadvantage of exterior lines to their command at that. Any movement off the hill into the plain would also bring them under the guns of all the artillery deployed onto the southern half of the ridgeline running from the Round Tops northward, it not being all that hard to turn the many, many 12-pounders and 3-inch rifles up there who would be in range by 120 degrees or so. The other alternative, turning north to roll up the line, is the fantasy of alternate history buffs, but the corps to Longstreet's left was not prepared to make the fixing attack which would have been necessary to make that work, and an attempt to roll up the ridge would have been taken in its own flank by the large Federal forces in the assembly area in turn. Even driving the Army of the Potomac off the ridge without shattering it would not have won the battle, the Army of Northern Virginia would still have been committed, outnumbered 2-1, without resupply against an enemy with a secure railhead, and cut off from retreat by rising water, possibly ending the war in 1864 but not in the way Lee envisioned.

    With McClellan in charge of the Army of the Potomac, turning the flank at Little Round Top might have won the battle tactically for the South, due to his weaknesses but not any inherent in the forces of that Army. That ship had sailed long before the first shot was fired.
    It's not often I consider myself schooled, especially in history. Well done, sir. I will make one feeble counterargument, which is that the suprise of a Confederate division in the Union assembly area could have prevented the effective response that you describe, while Hood, who was a superb battlefield commander (at the division level, at least), would have been prepared to exploit the situation. I give it about a 40% chance of success, as opposed to Pickett's charge, which had zero.

    Quote Originally Posted by wasp69 View Post
    I guess we will. However, in regards to Mr. Sherman, I will stick with his actual words and historical documentation as opposed to V D Hanson's analysis. I have read enough revisionist history in regards to the War for Southern Independence and do not wish to read any more from a man who has come to the conclusions Hanson has. Thank you, but no thank you.



    Indeed we most probably will. We should also go ahead and agree to disagree about Sherridan (who did more to make misery for the Indians than whiskey, smallpox, and "Ol' Hickory" from lessons learned in the Shenandoah) and US Grant (anti Semite).
    No, we'll agree on Sheridan. Grant's antisemitic General Order 11 remains one of the major blots on his record, although he subsequently appointed a number of Jews to high positions in his administration. However, he was an effective fighter, and, like Babe Ruth, gets points for accomplishing his greatest achievements while drunk.
    --Odysseus
    Sic Hacer Pace, Para Bellum.

    Before you can do things for people, you must be the kind of man who can get things done. But to get things done, you must love the doing, not the people!
    Reply With Quote  
     

  9. #19  
    Power CUer noonwitch's Avatar
    Join Date
    Oct 2008
    Location
    Warren, MI
    Posts
    12,433
    Quote Originally Posted by txradioguy View Post
    Republicans when we lose elections = We regroup figure out what we did wrong and get ready for the next time.

    Democrats when they lose elections = Crying wailing gnashing of teeth...calls for secession and loud unfounded claims of vote fraud.



    You DUmmies are pathetic.

    There are plenty of republicans at Free Republic who have been threatening to seccede over President Obama. The DUmmies don't represent all democrats any more the the Freepers represent all republicans.
    Reply With Quote  
     

  10. #20  
    Senior Member
    Join Date
    Jun 2005
    Location
    Woodland Park, Colorado, United States
    Posts
    8,563
    Quote Originally Posted by noonwitch View Post
    Okay, Ody, now I need to read a bio of Sherman-not that I ever sympathized with the Confederate States of American Traitors. He has been demonized over the years-mostly by David Selznick's amazing (for 1939) portrayal of the burning of Atlanta in GWTW.
    Lots of stuff in Michigan is named after Sherman.
    Those "Traitors" you demonize were Americans who wanted to remain American, as in Confederate States Of AMERICA. They felt that the Union was unfairly biased toward them and felt it was their right to voluntarily leave a Union they VOLUNTARILY joined. Your vitriol is not only unfounded and misplaced, it suggests gross ignorance and prejudice.
    Education without values, as useful as it is, seems rather to make man a more clever devil.
    C. S. Lewis
    Do not ever say that the desire to "do good" by force is a good motive. Neither power-lust nor stupidity are good motives. (Are you listening Barry)?:mad:
    Ayn Rand
    Reply With Quote  
     

Bookmarks
Bookmarks
Posting Permissions
  • You may not post new threads
  • You may not post replies
  • You may not post attachments
  • You may not edit your posts
  •